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THE GREATER GOOD: BROAD REMEDIES
FOR THE CHOSEN FEW, OR MORE
LIMITED, BUT ACCESSIBLE, REMEDIES
FOR THE MASSES?
Alfred G. Feliu*
Professor Burt Neuborne, in his fine and incisive essay,' wakes
us from our retrospective look at the proud history of the New
York City Commission on Human Rights (the "Commission") in
its fortieth anniversary year. He challenges us to look over the ho-
rizon with the fresh eyes and perspective of children, tempered
with the wisdom born of forty years of hard-earned experience.
Professor Neuborne is correct in doing so. While history is gen-
erally a great teacher, the current reality in which the Commission
and all human rights agencies find themselves has no precedent.
As Professor Neuborne correctly notes, the human rights issues of
our generation are more subtle, complex, and morally ambivalent
than those of prior generations. Today's more precise actions to
cure discrimination appropriately replace the broad legal measures
taken by prior generations. It is incumbent on human rights agen-
cies to respond with subtlety and sophistication to the often ambig-
uous factual situations in which discrimination claims arise today if
they are to retain the public's support for their efforts. As the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (the "EEOC") has
learned repeatedly in recent years, if it gets too far ahead of or out-
of-step with public opinion on current issues, its appropriations will
be cut in retaliation and its effectiveness will be diluted.
As Professor Neuborne also points out, whether or not the agen-
cies incur the ire of the legislative and executive branches, "we live
in an era of shrinking governmental resources."' The agencies
must simply learn to do more with less. How is this to be
accomplished?
Professor Neuborne sees, quite rightly I feel, two basic options
available to the Commission and other agencies, as reflected in his
question: "To what extent should the Commission focus on reme-
* Partner, Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker. B.A., Columbia University, 1978.
J.D., Columbia University, 1981.
1. Burt Neuborne, Who's Afraid of the Human Rights Commission?, 23 FORD-
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2. Id. at 1140.
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dying past acts of discrimination, or concentrate on preventing fu-
ture acts from occurring?" Professor Neuborne opts for the latter
approach; I agree.
In my commentary, I will try to accomplish two goals. First, I
will try to further buttress Professor Neuborne's arguments for re-
thinking the current enforcement paradigms employed by the
human rights agencies in carrying out their mandates. Second, I
will offer my own modest proposals for the shifting of existing en-
forcement paradigms.
The New, Old Paradigm
Professor Neuborne's analysis of the post-dispute approach now
used in the administration of human rights laws needs no repeat-
ing. Certainly, there is nothing wrong or unjust in expending re-
sources to "make whole" the victims of discrimination. The only
question is one of proportion-what percentage of the agencies'
resources should be expended on such efforts? Is society better
served by fully remedying the wrongs suffered by the few who pos-
sess the knowledge, energy, and persistence to pursue their claims
to the end, or should the agencies expend their limited resources
on preventing those wrongs in the first place? Professor Neuborne
posed the dilemma starkly, but accurately: "In a world of unlimited
resources, perhaps the human rights enforcement community could
pursue an aggressive post-event strategy, and couple it with power-
ful pre-event activity. In the real world, though, we must make
painful choices about available resources."3
Neither these issues nor the paradigm suggested by Professor
Neuborne (at least in the general sense) is new. Rather, history
demonstrates that they are present whenever new rights are cre-
ated in the workplace. Two conspicuous examples come to mind,
namely, the workers' compensation system and collective bargain-
ing under the National Labor Relations Act.
The workers' compensation system, created at the turn of the
century, manifested a societal policy choice to provide a certain,
albeit limited, recovery to those injured on the job. Without ques-
tion, this policy choice leads to injustice in some individual cases.
Surely, some employees seriously injured in the workplace receive
only a fraction of what they could recover from a third party for
the same injury. Similarly, others recover excessive, unwarranted
awards. We, as a society, chose and continue to choose to provide
3. Id. at 1144.
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a smaller recovery to more victims in recognition of the reality that
full recovery for all on-the-job injuries comes at a societal cost we
choose not to (or simply cannot) bear. We accept the tradeoff de-
spite the abuses, excesses, and injustices that are inherent in the
system.
The system of collective bargaining in the Wagner Act of 19351
reflects a similar set of tradeoffs. Post-dispute remediation, as de-
nominated by Professor Neuborne, takes place within the confines
of the grievance and arbitration system, a scaled-down due process
vehicle. For the most part, remedies have been privatized in this
setting because the government's monitoring of the system of in-
dustrial justice is minimal. Moreover, individual rights are sub-
sumed in the greater good of the broad interests of the bargaining
unit. This compromise, sixty years old and running, remains ac-
ceptable despite the injustices that may result in individual cases.
The time has come for us to consider acceptable compromises in
the area of human rights that will provide more protection against
discrimination to a greater portion of the population, but on a less
encompassing scale. The time has come to move from the granting
of large post-event monetary awards in a minuscule portion of
cases with viable claims to a surer, quicker, and less resource-inten-
sive system accessible to a broader portion of the affected
population.
Ending the tendency of many in the human rights community to
demonize employers is a necessary step in this process. As a repre-
sentative of employers in all aspects of employment issues, I am
constantly amazed at the striking naivete and disingenuousness of
that segment of the human rights community, including the agen-
cies, that is so quick to fault and place legal and moral blame on
employers for all improper behavior in and around the workplace.
This is accomplished principally through the application of strict
and, at times, vicarious liability.
Despite our most fervent wishes to the contrary, discrimination
in the workplace may not be eliminated simply by legal fiat, the
way OSHA decrees the proper location of emergency exits in a
manufacturing plant. Employers control buildings; they manage
people. There is a difference. Employees are not hatched in the
anteroom of their employers' human resources department.
Rather, they are complex creatures with behaviors, expectations,
and prejudices borne through decades of life experience. Employ-
4. 49 Stat. 449 (1935)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).
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ers should not be burdened with the responsibility of altering the
beliefs of individuals that spring from life experiences the employer
neither created nor can influence. Employers should be en-
couraged to educate and train employees in the expectations of the
law, and to manage them properly. It is absurd to ask employers to
guarantee behavior of the complex creatures we call employees.
The manager of the Yankees can coach a hitter, but cannot guaran-
tee a hit during each at bat. The hitter may still swing at a bad
pitch and strike out despite all the coaching and counseling the
team can provide. Similarly, in the workplace, employers manage;
they do not control psyches, behaviors, and prejudices. Holding
employers strictly or vicariously liable is simply society's cowardly
way of seeking to transfer blame onto employers for its own failure
to instill tolerance of diversity in its citizens.
A more "modern" and effective paradigm, would draw employ-
ers into the process and entice them into becoming partners in the
eradication of discrimination in the workplace through the estab-
lishment of positive incentives. Professor Neuborne quite rightly
points out that employers are often, though not always, also victims
where discrimination occurs in their workplaces. Discrimination in
the workplace is, after all, injurious to the victim's employer as a
distortion of reasoned and cost-effective management. The team
suffers along with the batter who strikes out. The goal of manage-
ment is the efficient use of its available resources, human as well as
material. A value system rooted in personal prejudice and applied
by an individual manager or supervisor distorts that goal and inter-
feres with the success of the enterprise.
It is clear to me that the human rights community is either insen-
sitive to or unaware of the deep resentment with which employers
view their treatment at the hands of the agencies following an accu-
sation of discrimination or harassment. No matter how much effort
is expended, no matter how many controls are in place, employers
simply cannot mandate or guarantee fair treatment in the work-
place in all instances as long as those complex instrumentalities
known as human beings serve as its management and workforce.
To hold a deep-pocketed employer liable in this circumstance dem-
onstrates that employers are not viewed as participants in the pro-
cess, but rather as the fall guys in the event unlawful behavior
occurs despite their best efforts. Employers, in my experience, are
as offended and saddened by acts of discrimination that occur in
their workplaces, despite their good intentions, as are the victims.
Like the parent called to the principal's office, employers feel the
1174
THE GREATER GOOD
shame of these failures. The punishment, however, should fall
most heavily on the wayward child, not on the parent. As stated by
Professor Neuborne: "From the dual standpoints of deterrence and
moral responsibility, the guilty actor in a human rights drama
should pay the financial price of restoring a sense of balance."5
Safe Harbors and ADR
Underlying Professor Neuborne's "modest" proposal is an un-
stated call for a return to an age when individuals actually bore
responsibility for their actions. How revolutionary, how contrary is
that notion to the dominant philosophy of our legal system that so
often absolves individuals from the responsibility for their actions,
and in the case of injuries in the workplace, substitutes employers
for injury-inflicting individuals? Gone are the days, under emerg-
ing negligence principles, where an interceding unlawful act, such
as a robbery or a homicide by an employee or intruder in the work-
place, would absolve the employer from responsibility so long as
the employer did not contribute to the injury in a meaningful way.
Gone are the days where a sexual assault by a supervisor is a crimi-
nal act by an individual and not the violation of the rights of the
victim by the employer.
Professor Neuborne calls for a return to a world of personal re-
sponsibility where supervisors are held individually liable for their
actions in the first instance. How can there be a credible argument
against such an obviously correct goal? Professor Neuborne would
not fully absolve the employer, but rather would hold the employer
liable where the guilty supervisor lacks the financial resources to
satisfy the judgment or where the guilty parties are unknown. He
would also hold the employer liable if the employer is "morally
culpable." This is a good beginning, although only that.
Professor Neuborne goes on to propose a safe harbor for em-
ployers who enact policies and enforce practices that conform with
the expectations of the law. He suggests that such employers and
their policies receive certification from the City Commission and,
where such certifications are in place, the employer would be ab-
solved from derivative liability. In the absence of a Commission-
certified plan, an employer would be liable automatically for any
derivative liability. Professor Neuborne writes: "By narrowing its
remedial focus to the guilty individuals, and providing an incentive
for employers to adopt effective preventive plans, the Commission
5. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1146.
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would increase deterrent impact and amplify its ability to induce
employers to prevent discrimination before it occurs." 6
The notion of "safe harbors" for employers with proper policies
in place already exists under the City Human Rights Law.7 This
"pre-event" approach to enforcement of the City Law should be
expanded in the manner suggested by Professor Neuborne, and be-
yond. Only in this manner can the Commission truly impact the
lives of all employees in New York City in a tangible, broad-based
way. By deputizing employers, with the Commission's supervision
and oversight, the Commission will expand its reach and impact
beyond what its increasingly limited resources would otherwise
permit.
An instructive example of the "safe harbor" approach in a re-
lated area can be found in the enactment of the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act of 1990,8 in which Congress sought to ad-
dress the problem of waivers by older workers of their legal rights.
Congress could have permitted the EEOC to litigate the issue in
countless cases until a legal resolution on the issue was reached.
Instead, Congress laid out in the statute a series of specific require-
ments that employers were required to include in releases if they
were to be enforceable. The statute worked, and few releases are
offered today-even in settings beyond those impacting older
workers-by knowledgeable employers without the required provi-
sions. Once employers were informed of the requirements, they
complied, and the rights of countless employees were enhanced as
a result.
How might the Commission constructively expand on the notion
of safe harbors? I offer my own modest proposal. For nearly a
decade, the Commission has been a leader in the area of alterna-
tive dispute resolution ("ADR"). The Commission's mediation
program is a model from which all human rights agencies, including
the EEOC, could learn. The program's effectiveness in reducing
the agency's caseload and providing an avenue for prompt resolu-
tion of human rights claims is indisputable. By employing profes-
sionals to mediate pending complaints, the Commission has been
able to resolve many disputes quickly, freeing up resources to be
applied to the remaining cases on its docket.
ADR is not a passing fad, as many had predicted, but rather is an
essential tool in the arsenal of dispute resolution for an increasing
6. Id. at 1163.
7. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(13)(d) (1996).
8. Pub. L. 101-433 § 1, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
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number of employers. Programs vary and are often still in the ex-
perimental stages but the trend in favor of ADR is undeniable.
Whether programs emphasize mediation, arbitration, peer review,
or other forms of binding or non-binding ADR, the goal is to re-
solve employment disputes at the level best suited to resolving such
disputes-in a non-adversarial workplace setting.
I urge the Commission to avoid the mistake which the EEOC
has made in this matter. Rather than trying to embrace this rapidly
developing area, the EEOC has decided to tilt at windmills by
making its opposition to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration a key
component of its national enforcement plan. Employers can only
stand on the sidelines and shake their heads at the irony of the
EEOC lecturing them about due process and the rights of employ-
ees, knowing the grievous injuries that the EEOC has inflicted on
parties before the agency (employers included) over the years
through its interminable delays: justice delayed is, in fact, justice
denied. Is it just to have a charging party wait three or more years
for the resolution of a charge of discrimination? Is it fair to an
innocent supervisor to stand accused for that period of time with
no means to clear his or her name? The EEOC's concession to
political pressure, imposed mainly by the self-interested plaintiffs'
bar, to take on the cause of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, has
prevented it from playing a constructive role in the ADR
revolution.
Certain basic facts and trends cannot be contested. First, em-
ployers will adopt ADR in greater numbers in the coming years.
Second, as the courts, including the Supreme Court, have consist-
ently found, employment disputes may be resolved by arbitration,
even where the arbitration program is made a condition of employ-
ment.9 The issues that the courts have not fully resolved, and will
be addressing in the years to come, have to do with the fairness of
the arbitration procedures actually implemented. It is here that the
Commission can have the greatest impact. It can create a safe har-
bor for employers who ensure due process in the context of their
internal ADR programs. The Commission could define the param-
eters of due process and agree to defer pending complaints to any
employer program that satisfies the established due process re-
quirements. As a model, the Commission could look to the "Pro-
9. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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tocol" recently published by a special committee of the American
Bar Association. 10
This approach is not novel, although it would be new to the
human rights area. The Commission could look to the National
Labor Relations Board and its long-standing policy of deferring to
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements (known as the
Collyer doctrine)" for guidance and support. Under this approach,
the Commission would not abdicate its enforcement responsibili-
ties (as some might suggest), as it would have two opportunities to
influence and ensure the fairness of the system and the results in a
particular case. First, it could define the essential terms of a duly
sanctioned program (and pre-certify it if the Commission is pre-
pared to expend the necessary resources to do so). Second, it could
review the results of the actual arbitration (or other ADR vehicle
such as a peer review panel) upon completion of the process to
ensure compliance with the mandates of the program. By adopting
this approach, the Commission could play a dynamic role in the
process that could become the principal means of resolving em-
ployment disputes for decades to come.
On a more modest level, the Commission could require that an
employer's internal remedies be exhausted before the complaint
process begins. After a matter has been addressed internally, the
Commission could review the record and accord the employer's in-
ternal proceedings the weight they deserve. Of course, if the inter-
nal program includes the increasingly popular mediation of
employment disputes, the Commission's deferral to the system will
merely be giving the parties an opportunity to resolve the dispute
voluntarily, as a mediator is without authority to mandate a result.
If the internal program results in a binding result, the Commission
could always reject the result if the employee was not afforded due
process, or for other sound reasons.
Certainly, many issues remain to be resolved. For example, un-
like in the union setting, where the employee may be unrepre-
sented, must the employee be represented by counsel for the
10. Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution In Employment, A Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Em-
ployment Relationship, reprinted in Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 91, at D-34 (May
11, 1995). This Protocol has been endorsed by the National Academy of Arbitrators,
the ABA Labor & Employment Law Section, and the National Employment Lawyers
Association.
11. In Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), the National Labor Rela-
tions Board required that arbitration remedies be exhausted before it would consider
an unfair labor practice claim.
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decision to be binding? By addressing such questions, the Com-
mission can exert a constructive and powerful influence on one of
the most important trends in the area of human rights and employ-
ment law-the privatization of dispute resolution related to work-
place claims. The long-established and respected role of
arbitration in the labor-management setting demonstrates that the
most fundamental questions regarding employment relations can
be resolved privately-so long as the system developed is fair and
just.
What is required, however, is creativity and compromise from all
interested parties, and an acceptance of the basic, inevitable truth
that human rights claims, like workers' compensation and labor-
management claims before them, are not well suited for litigation
or even prolonged administrative proceedings. Rather, we must
adapt the current system to make the guarantee of human and civil
rights in the workplace a reality for a greater number of individu-
als, rather than for the lucky or persistent few who successfully
navigate the system as it exists today. We must accept that the
greater good lies not in keeping human rights encased in a picture
window to be admired from afar. Instead, that good is achieved by
making human rights more accessible to the general population
through more streamlined, less costly procedures that actively and
constructively involve employers in, rather than making them the
target of, the process.
1996] 1179

